Crowdsourcing with All-pay Auctions: a Field Experiment on Taskcn
Abstract：To understand the effects of incentives on crowdsourcing participation and submission quality, we conduct a ﬁeld experiment on Taskcn, a large Chinese crowdsourcing site using all-pay auction mechanisms. We systematically vary the size of the reward, and the presence of a soft reserve in the form of the early entry of a high-quality submission. We ﬁnd that a higher reward induces signiﬁcantly more submissions and attracts higher quality users. However, unpredicted by theory, we ﬁnd that high-quality users are significantly less likely to enter tasks where a high quality solution has already been submitted, resulting in lower quality in subsequent submissions in such soft reserve treatments.
主讲人: Tracy Xiao Liu (清华大学经济管理学院)